Case Notes by unknown
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 27 Issue 1 Article 8 
1958 
Case Notes 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Case Notes, 27 Fordham L. Rev. 112 (1958). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol27/iss1/8 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
CASE NOTES
Adrniralty-Shipowner's Liability Under Jones Act for Death or Injury
of Seaman Resulting From Violation of Navigation Rule.-Petitioner's
tug carried its navigation lamp only three feet above the water in violation of
a Coast Guard regulation which required a height of eight feet. Because of the
proximity of the lamp to the water, floating oil caught fire; the tug burned,
and claimant's intestate, a seaman employed aboard the tug, lost his life. The
owner of the tug filed a petition for limitation of, or exoneration from, liability
and the claimant filed a claim in the limitation proceeding for wrongful death
under the Jones Act. The district court exonerated the petitioner. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. On certiorari, the
Supreme Court of the United States held, four Justices dissenting, reversed.
In an action under the Jones Act, the shipowner is liable if a seaman's death
or injury results from a failure to observe a statutory safety regulation, not-
withstanding that the casualty which results is not the type which the statute is
intended to prevent. Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426 (1958).
There was no cause of action under the general maritime law for wrongful
death of a seaman caused by another's negligence.' As a result the federal courts
resorted to the state death acts to provide a remedy.2 In 1920 the Jones Act3
gave a cause of action for wrongful death of a seaman, and incorporated by
reference those provisions4 of the Federal Employer's Liability Act which relate
to employee personal injury and death actions. Where it is applicable, the Jones
1. Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921); The Alaska, 130 U.S. 201 (1889);
The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886). Nor was there an action under the general maritime
law for wrongful death caused by the unseaworthiness of the vessel. Lindgren v. United
States, 281 U.S. 38, 47 (1930).
2. See cases collected and discussed in Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, supra note 1 at 240-42
(1921).
3. 46 U.S.C.A. § 688 (1944). It reads: "Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury
in the course of his employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law,
with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States modifying
or extending the common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway
employees shall apply; and in case of the death of any seaman as a result of any such per-
sonal injury the personal representative of such seaman may maintain an action for damages
at law with the right of trial by jury, and in such actions all statutes of the United States
conferring or regulating the right of action for death in the case of railway employees shall
be applicable."
4. The applicable provisions of the Federal Employer's Liability Act. i.e., 45 U.S.C.A.
§§ 51-60 (1954) are, therefore, incorporated into the Jones Act. Buzynski v. Luckenbach
S.S. Co., 277 U.S. 226, 228 (1928). Section 1 of the FELA provides that a railroad in inter-
state commerce ". . . shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is
employed by such carrier in such commerce, or, in the case of the death of such employee,
to his or her personal representative . . . for such injury or death resulting in whole or in
part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier, or by
reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances,
machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats, wharves, or other equipment." 45 U.S.C.A. § 51
(1954).
CASE NOTES
Act ". . . is paramount and exclusive, and supersedes the operation of all state
statutes dealing with that subject."5
An employer is liable under section 1 of the FELA not only for negligence 6
but also, by reason of sections 3 and 4 of the act, for injuries to, or the death of
an employee which would not have occurred except for a violation by the
employer of "any statute" enacted for the safety of employees.1 Only the
violation of the Safety Appliance Act8 or the Boiler Inspection Act9 has in the
past given rise to a "safety statute action" under the FELA. It is no defense
that the employer used due diligence to comply with the safety statute,10 or
that the injury sustained was not the injury which the statute was intended to
prevent.:"
The majority in the instant case extended these principles to an action under
5. Lindgren v. United States, 281 U.S. 38, 47 (1930). In 1920, Congress also passed the
Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 761-68 (1944). The first section of the act
provides a remedy for wrongful death "caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring
on the high seas beyond a marine league from the shore of any State ... ." A seaman's
personal representative evidently has a choice of suing under the Jones Act or the High
Seas Act where both are, by their terms, applicable. Gilmore & Black, Admiralty §§ 6-30
(1957).
6. It had always been held that negligence under the FELA (aside from cases involving
violation of a safety statute) was common-law negligence. Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163,
182 (1949) ; Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54, 67 (1943). However, in Rogers
v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 509 (1957), Justice Brennan, referring to FELA negli-
gence, stated that ". . the special features of this statutory negligence action . . . make it
significantly different from the ordinary common-law negligence action. . . ." See 56 Mich.
L. Rev. 143 (1957). In the instant case Justice Brennan noted that FELA negligence is
"analogous to" but by no means "identical to" common-law negligence.
7. Section 3 of the FELA provides that contributory negligence is not a defense where
injury occurs because of ". .. the violation by such common carrier of any statute enacted
for the safety of employees. . . ." 45 U.S.C.A. § 53 (1954). Section 4 similarly eliminates
the defense of assumption of the risk. 45 U.S.C.A. § 54 (1954). Of these sections, Congress
has said, "the proviso in section 3 is to the effect that contributory negligence shall not be
charged to the employee if he is injured or killed by reason of the violation, by the employer,
of any statute enacted for the safety of employees. The effect of the provision is to make
a violation of such a statute negligence per se on the part of the employer .... Section 4
.. . likewise makes the violation of such a statute negligence per se on the part of the
employer. . . ." H.R. Rep. No. 1386, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1908). See also San Antonio
& Aransas Pass Ry. v. Wagner, 241 U.S. 476, 484 (1916).
8. 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-16 (1954). See Coray v. Southern Pac. Co., 335 U.S. 520 (1949).
9. 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 22-34 (1954). See Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949).
10. Lilly v. Grand Trunk W.R.R., 317 U.S. 481 (1943); Minneapolis & St. L.R.R. v.
Gotschall, 244 U.S. 66 (1917).
11. Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949); Brady v. Terminal Railroad Ass'n, 303 U.S.
10 (1938); Davis v. Wolfe, 263 U.S. 239 (1923). The common-law rule requires that the
injury be of the kind which the statute is designed to prevent. Prosser, Torts § 34 (2d ed.
1955). The departure, in the FELA cases, from the common-law rule is at least not in
conflict with the intent of Congress to create a negligence per se remedy by force of §§ 3-4
of the act.
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the Jones Act and held that the violation of the Coast Guard navigation rule,'1 2
which caused the death of claimant's intestate, gave a cause of action for wrong-
ful death, even though the purpose of the navigation rule was to prevent
collision, a disaster different from that which occurred in the present case. The
majority argued that the congressional policy underlying the Jones Act and the
FELA is analogous to that which prompted workmen's compensation statutes, 3
namely, to shift to industry the burden of "human overhead" and to provide
"liberal recoveries for injured workers."1 4 The majority reasoned, therefore,
that Congress must not have intended the creation of a static remedy under
the Jones Act and the FELA, but one which would be developed and enlarged
to meet changing concepts of industry's duty toward its workers. Thus, the
Court rejected the common-law view that for liability to arise the casualty must
be of the type which the statute was designed to prevent. Evidently the Court
considered that it was merely fulfilling its function of defining duties and
developing remedies under both statutes by applying FELA-Safety Act prin-
ciples to a Jones Act-Navigation Rule case.
According to the minority, the absolute liability under the FELA, which has
been held to arise out of violations of the Safety Appliance Act and the Boiler
Inspection Act, is traceable to a special relationship between these acts and the
FELA. Indeed, the Supreme Court has said that these statutes and the FELA
are in pari materia,15 and the two safety acts have even been called "amend-
ments" to the FELA.'I Furthermore, the minority argued that a cross reference
in sections 3 and 4 of the FELA to ". . . any statute enacted for the safety
of employees . . . ," clearly was intended to refer to the Safety Appliance Act
and the Boiler Inspection Act; that since no cross reference to the navigation
rule, which was violated in the instant case, could be found in the Jones Act,
a violation of such rule could not impose absolute liability under the Jones Act.
The minority therefore decided that the absolute liability remedy under the
FELA could not be extended to Jones Act cases. The dissenting Justices, con-
sidering the negligence remedy under the FELA to be of the common-law
variety, concluded that a common-law negligence action should be the only one
available under the Jones Act.
Congress plainly intended that the violation of any statute, enacted for the
safety of railroad employees with resultant injuries, should give rise to absolute
liability.1 The navigation rule in the instant case was promulgated under
12. The rule is set forth in 33 C.F.R. § 80.16(h) (1949), and was promulgated pursuant
to 33 U.S.C.A. § 157 (1957).
13. But see the dissent of Justice Roberts in Bailey v. Central Vt. Ry., 319 U.S. 350
(1943). "I yield to none in my belief in the wisdom and equity of workmen's compensation
laws, but I do not conceive it to be within our judicial function to write the policy which
underlines compensation laws into acts of Congress when Congress has not chosen that
policy but, instead, has adopted the common-law doctrine of negligence." Id. at 358.
14. Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 432 (1958), citing Rogers v. Mis-
souri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 508-10 (1956).
15. San Antonio & Aransas Pass Ry. v. Wagner, 241 U.S. 476, 484 (1916).
16. Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 189 (1949).
17. Neither the House of Representatives report, H.R. Rep. No. 1386, 60th Cong., 1st Sess.
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authority of a statute which provides for such navigation rules as are "necessary
for safety."18 While it has not been held before that seamen are among those
intended to be protected by this statute, nevertheless this Court, in so deciding
in this case of first impression, seems to have interpreted the statute reasonably.
Since applicable provisions of the FELA are incorporated into the Jones Act, 19
the majority correctly imposed absolute liability under the Jones Act for viola-
tion of the Coast Guard navigation rule.
Nor does the recurrent holding in the Jones Act cases that damages may be
recovered thereunder only for negligence20 bar a recovery in the instant case.
In line with the policy that the Jones Act must be liberally interpreted 2' as
welfare legislation,22 the courts have discarded the common-law definition of
negligence.2 3 In the landmark case of Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line Inc.,
Justice Cardozo said of the Jones Act, "congress did not mean that the standards
of legal duty must be the same by land and sea. Congress meant no more than
this, that the duty must be legal, i.e., imposed by law; that it shall have been
imposed for the benefit of the seaman, and for the promotion of his health or
safety; and that the negligent omission to fulfill it shall have resulted in damage
to his person. When this concurrence of duty, of negligence and of personal
injury is made out, the seaman's remedy is to be the same as if a like duty had
been imposed by law upon carriers by rail."2 4 There is no great difficulty,
therefore, in assimilating the FELA statutory liability per se cause of action
into the Jones Act. 25
(1908), nor the Senate report, S. Rep. No. 460, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. (1908), implies that
the liability for violation of a safety statute is to be restricted, by definition, to the Safety
Appliance Act and the Boiler Inspection Act. Rather the inference is that it should extend
to any applicable safety statute, the two just mentioned being the only ones presently
applicable. See note 7 supra.
18. 33 U.S.C.A. § 157 (1957).
19. See note 4 supra.
20. De Zon v. American President Lines, 318 U.S. 660, 671 (1943); Engel v. Davenport,
271 U.S. 33, 36 (1926).
21. Garret v. Moore-McCormack SS. Co., 317 U.S. 239, 248 (1942).
22. Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. McAllister, 337 U.S. 783, 790 (1949).
23. Forgione v. United States, 202 F.2d 249, 252 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 966
(1953); Koehler v. Presque-Isle Transp. Co., 141 F.2d 490 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S.
764 (1944). As a result, an assault has been considered Jones Act negligence. Jamison v.
Encarnacion, 281 U.S. 635 (1930). As one writer has noted, the abandonment of the
common-law definition of negligence in Jones Act cases "... . provides leeway for the finding
of 'negligence' virtually as desired." Comment, The Tangled Seine: A Survey of Maritime
Personal Injury Remedies, 57 Yale L.J. 243, n.79 (1947).
24. 287 US. 367, 377-78 (1932).
25. The minority claimed that FELA "absolute liability" is distinguishable from "negli-
gence per se," apparently hoping thereby to exclude such liability from even the broad
definition given to negligence by the Jones Act cases (none of which were cited by either
majority or minority). The distinction is semantic, not legal. The courts have used both
terms. Compare O'Donnell v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 338 U.S. 384, 390 (1949) (absolute
liability), with Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 188-89 (1949) (negligence per se).
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Constitutional Law - Due Process Requirements for Obtaining Limited
In Personam Jurisdiction over a Foreign Corporation.-A California resi-
dent was insured by a foreign corporation which mailed the certificate of insur-
ance to the insured from out of state. Premium payments were mailed in
California addressed to the company's office in Texas. The insurer maintained
no office or agent in California, and the record disclosed no other transactions
by the insurer in California apart from the instant policy. Upon refusal of the
defendant insurer to pay on the policy at the death of the insured, the bene-
ficiary brought suit in a California court. In accordance with a state statute,
subjecting foreign corporations to suit in California on insurance contracts
made with California residents, where such corporations could not be served
within the state, process was duly mailed to defendant in Texas. A judgment
obtained in California was refused enforcement by the Texas courts. The
Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari and held, the Chief
Justice not participating, reversed. A statute permitting service outside the
state on a foreign insurance corporation satisfies due process where the state
has a substantial contact with the transaction in controversy, providing the
inconvenience to the foreign corporation does not amount to a denial of due
process. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
Pennoyer v. Neff,' decided by the Supreme Court in 1878, held that in a state
court action against an individual nonresident defendant ". . . due process of
law would require appearance or personal service before the defendant would
be personally bound by any judgment rendered." 2 Soon afterwards the same
Court held this doctrine to be equally applicable to personal judgments obtained
against foreign corporations. 3 However, the strict requirements of due process
imposed on state courts4 in these earlier decisions have been modified in several
instances where individuals are involved, and have been greatly liberalized with
regard to foreign corporations.
In 1945 in International Shoe Co. v. Washington5 the Supreme Court rejected
all prior standards for determining the right of a state to subject a foreign
corporation to its tribunals and applied the "minimum contacts" test.6 The
Court stated that "fair play and substantial justice" is had if the foreign corpora-
tion has a minimum of contacts within the state, and the sufficiency of the
1. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
2. Id. at 741.
3. St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350 (1882).
4. The federal courts, however, are limited in jurisdiction only by acts of Congress
which "has power ... to provide that the process of every district court shall run into every
part of the United States." Robertson v. R.R. Labor Board, 268 U.S. 619, 622 (1925). But
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(g) limits the effectiveness of process to the state in which the district
court is located or outside the state if authorized by statute.
5. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
6. Prior to this decision the right of a state to condition the entry of a foreign corpora-
tion into its territory had given rise to several criteria designated "consent," "doing business"
and "presence" to measure the limits of state court jurisdiction over foreign corporations.
St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350 (1882) ; Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert Inc., 45 F.2d 139 (2d
Cir. 1930).
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contacts is to be judged not only by their quantity but also by the nature and
quality of the activities. The Court also considered the inconveniences to the
foreign corporation, which would result from compelling it to submit to suit
away from its home state, and found under the circumstances of the case no
denial of due process as a result of the imposition of such inconveniences.
Despite the broad language of the case, however, the decision was based on a
finding that the corporation's activities were neither "irregular nor casual," but
rather "systematic and continuous." 7
More recently, in Traveler's Health Ass'n v. Virginia,8 the Court, continuing
the "minimum contacts" test, advanced the idea of the state's governmental
interest in insurance transactions as a controlling factor. But the Court also
found that the insurance firm in question did not engage in mere isolated or
short lived transactions Thus, until the instant case, the Supreme Court
cases had noted a regular course of business carried on by the corporation in
holding that jurisdiction would attach.
In the present case, the state statute specified several acts, any one of which
purported to constitute a ground for the state to exercise jurisdiction over a
foreign insurance corporation. 10 The defendant, by using the mails to transmit
its policy into California and by receiving premiums from within that state,
became amenable to process under the statute. The Court paid little heed to the
isolated character of the transaction involved, but emphasized that due process
was complied with because the suit was based on a contract which had a sub-
stantial connection with the state. The connection consisted of the contacts
surrounding the single policy of insurance plus the state's manifest interest in
providing a remedy for its residents in actions of this kind. Considered also
was the fact that the inconvenience to the insurer involved in defending a suit
in a foreign jurisdiction did not constitute a denial of due process.
The instant case makes it clear enough that insurance is a field in which the
state has a sufficient governmental interest,"' and that minimal contacts will
support the assertion of jurisdiction. It is also evident that no iron clad rules
can be laid down to determine when jurisdiction over foreign corporations
involved in other types of business transactions will attach. Rather, a sliding
scale must be adopted to weigh the facts of each case. Given a single contact
with the state, the question becomes: is there a sufficient governmental interest
in the transaction involved to outweigh the lack of quantity inherent in this
factor and the possible inconvenience to the foreign corporation? If the field is
one over which the state has no strong governmental interest, then there is
reason to believe that jurisdiction will not attach on the basis of one contact,
but more will be required, even though the traditional requirements of "doing
7. 326 U.S. at 320.
8. 339 U.S. 643 (1949).
9. Id. at 648.
10. Cal. Ins. Code §§ 1610-13 (1949).
11. Evidentiary of such interest is the fact that several states including Texas have
adopted the Unauthorized Insurer's Act in varying forms. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. § 2138
(Supp. 1957); Note, 39 Va. L. Rev. 966 (1953).
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business" need not be met.1 2 The greater the interest of the state, the less
weight will be given to the inconveniences involved and fewer contacts will be
needed.
The tests set forth will find particular application where state statutes subject
foreign corporations generally to the jurisdiction of state courts in suits sounding
in tort or contract based on a contact of the corporation within the state. In
Johns v. Bay State Abrasive Products Co. 13 a federal district court considered
such a statute14 and stated that "it can properly be given valid application to
a limited extent" by applying the criteria established by the Supreme Court in
its decisions. 15 The instant case will give a new stature to this type of legislation
and to the prior decisions of the state courts which were considered as having
gone further than the Supreme Court of the United States.16
There has been a slower trend on the part of state legislatures attempting
to expand jurisdiction over nonresident individuals, since in the case of indi-
viduals the states must legislate within the restrictions of the privileges and
immunities clause.17 With respect to both individuals and corporations, the
primary legislation has been the nonresident motorist statutes,' 8 in which the
jurisdiction for exercising jurisdiction lies in the manifest interest a state has
in controlling travel on its highways, so as to protect its citizens from the serious
dangers to person and property attendant upon the use of automobiles. 19
Substituted service upon a nonresident individual has also been allowed in a
case where corporate securities were sold within a state and there was a clear
recognition of governmental interest.20
The standards set forth in the instant case, although bound to affect the
concept of due process as regards nonresident individuals, are not likely to have
immediate application in this field because of the paucity of legislation, but
will probably be widely applied in cases involving corporations. Here the deci-
sion will undoubtedly produce a wide variety of statutes attempting to obtain
jurisdiction over foreign corporations under any circumstances where there has
been a contact with the state. It will require the restraining force of the courts
to assure due process to foreign litigants in compliance with the "substantial
justice" theory.
12. Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Co., 130 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Pa.), upheld on rehearing,
132 F. Supp. 556 (W.D. Pa. 1955), aff'd 251 F.2d 447 (1958).
13. 89 F. Supp. 654 (D. Md. 1950).
14. Md. Ann. Code art. 23, § 119(d) (Supp. 1957).
15. 89 F. Supp. at 662.
16. Florio v. Powder Power Tool Corp., 248 F.2d 367 (3d Cir. 1957). Footnote 10
appended to this decision notes the existence in several states of jurisdictional statutes
attempting to cover both tort and contract suits.
17. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
18. See, e.g., N.Y. Vehicle & Traffic Law § 52.
19. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
20. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935).
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Constitutional Law - State Taxation of the Private Beneficial Use of Fed-
eral Property.-Defendant corporation leased a federally owned industrial
plant in Detroit. A state statute imposed a tax, assessed according to the full value
of the tax-exempt property, upon private lessees or users of such property when
using it in a business conducted for profit. The tax was upheld in the lower
court. The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed. On appeal to the United States
Supreme Court, held, two justices concurring and two justices dissenting,
affirmed. Where a lessee of federal property is taxed under a state statute
providing for taxation of the private beneficial use of otherwise tax-exempt prop-
erty, based upon an assessment of the total value of the property, it .does not
violate the United States' constitutional immunity from state taxation, and
such a tax is not discriminatory. United States v. Detroit, 78 Sup. Ct. 474 (1958).
Generally, no state may tax any property, property interest or instrumentality
of the federal government' without the prior consent of Congress.2 At the same
time, "all subjects over which the sovereign power of a state extends, are
objects of taxation."-3 Thus, benefits received from the United States by a
government contractor were held an object of state taxation,4 and the fact that
a "costs-plus" contractor purchased goods, title to which was later to vest in
the Government, did not except his vendor from the statutory duty of adding
a state sales tax to the purchase price.5 So too, a contractor who used govern-
ment chattels was liable for a state tax upon his use of government owned
property jn the performance of the contract.8 However, an undisguised state
ad valorem property tax based upon an assessment which included the value of
government fixtures on the property of a bailee was not upheld,7 whereas a
privilege or use tax, assessed in the same fashion, that is, upon the total value
of the property used, and payable by the user, was held valid.8
In United States v. Township of Muskegon,9 the first of two other closely
related cases decided on the same day as the instant case, the majority found
only two factual differences to distinguish it from the present case, and resolved
it upon the same principles. There the tenant was in possession under a permit
instead of a lease, and was engaged to work under a government contract.
Imposition of the same tax, and assessment in the same fashion were held valid,
1. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 159 (1819).
2. The Congress may enact "... all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the ...
Property belonging to the United States... ." U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
3. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 159, 210 (1819). The proposition was
again discussed at length in Weston v. City Council, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 338 (1829).
4. James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 161 (1937).
5. Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1 (1941).
6. Curry v. United States, 314 U.S. 14 (1941). The same rule was applied to a tax upon
the privilege of storing government owned gasoline in Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Evans, 345
U.S. 495 (1953).
7. United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174 (1944).
8. Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Evans, 345 U.S. 495 (1953); Curry v. United States, 314
U.S. 14 (1941) ; more currently, see Detroit v. Murray Corp., 78 Sup. Ct. 458 (1958) ; United
States v. Township of Muskegon, 78 Sup. Ct. 483 (1958).
9. 78 Sup. Ct. 483 (1938).
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Justices Whittaker and Burton again dissenting on essentially the same grounds
as in the case at bar. In the last case, Detroit v. Murray Corp.,'0 another state
tax, again based upon the full value of the personal property used, was levied
upon government owned chattels in the possession of a subcontractor, and the
Court, reversing the findings of the lower courts," construed the tax as one
upon use of personal property rather than upon the property itself, and hence
valid.
In the instant case the Court found that the tax involved was one upon the use
of the property, not upon its ownership. Citing Henneford v. Silas Mason Co. 12
for the proposition that a tax upon beneficial use has long been commonplace in
this country, the Court justified the basis of the assessment, namely, the total
value of the property, by reference to previous decisions of the Court which have
approved the same method. 13 To the Government's claim that, since the tax was
measured by the value of the property used, it should be treated as nothing but
a contrivance to lay a tax upon that property, the majority answered that the
use of exempt property was worth as much as the use of comparable taxable
property over a similar period of time.
Justices Whittaker and Burton, dissenting, maintained that whether the state
tax was to be construed as an ad valorem property tax or a mere use tax, only
the leasehold interest of the tenant could be used as a basis for measurement of
the tax, and that allowance of a greater basis was an approval of a state tax
upon federal property. 14 In support of this position the dissenting Justices
included extensive reference to United States v. Allegheny County,'5 where the
Court found that the real property tax in question was assessed upon a value
which included, as part of its basis, the value of the Government's titled interest
in certain fixtures on the premises, and held that such a tax could not constitu-
tionally be levied upon the bailee in possession. Since the Allegheny decision
turned upon the finding that the tax was nothing but an ad valorem property
tax and that imposition of such a tax upon the Government's fixtures was uncon-
stitutional, the Court's discussion therein of the bailee's liability for the assessed
valuation would appear to lend no support to the specific point urged by the
dissenters, that a use tax with a full value assessment as its basis cannot con-
stitutionally stand. The Allegheny ruling supports the distinct proposition that
a property tax and full value assessment cannot coexist when federal property is
involved, but because the tax in this case was clearly a use tax, the majority did
not think that case was at all controlling.
Further, the Court found that the tax was not arbitrary or invidiously dis-
criminatory in its application, since it applied to all private citizens who used
10. 78 Sup. Ct. 458 (1958).
11. The value of the case as controlling precedent is somewhat diminished by the fact
that four Justices (Whittaker, Frankfurter, Burton and Harlan) dissented on the merits.
The lower courts' decisions are reported at 132 F. Supp. 899 (E.D. Mich. 1955) and 234
F.2d 380 (6th Cir. 1956).
12. 300 U.S. 577, 582-83 (1937).
13. See note 8 supra.
14. 78 Sup. Ct. 474, 482 (1958) (dissenting opinion).
15. 322 U.S. 174 (1944).
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any tax exempt property within the state for profit. Although lessees of taxed
properties were not included, the Court did not find this omission significant
since the obvious intent of the state legislature was to equate the burdens of
those private enterprises using exempt properties and those owning taxed prop-
erty, or those using it, to whom the owner's tax is passed either directly by
contract or indirectly through higher rentals. Therefore, since in practical result
neither the tax burdens nor the benefits enjoyed by either class are inconsistent,
the classification was reasonable.
The third case, Detroit v. Murray Corp.,16 presented the Court with a
greater problem, since, while in the first two cases the tax was expressly one upon
use, and was to stand or fall in accord with the Court's determination of the
validity of such a tax and its computation, in this case the Court found it neces-
sary to "look through form and behind labels to substance"'1 to determine that
the tax was one upon use and not upon ownership. Indeed, it appeared that the
appellant city maintained in both the district and circuit courts18 that, under
applicable government regulations, title to the property could not have vested in
the Government in the manner provided by the contract,'9 and that, therefore,
title was in respondent corporation and subject to the tax. Clearly the appellant
city had attempted to justify the tax as dn ad valorem tax upon property of a
private owner rather than a use tax. Nonetheless, the Court, with a vigor it
did not display in the Allegheny case, looked "through form and behind labels"20
to find that the tax was again, in this third case, one upon use.
The position adopted by the appellant city, the decision in the Allegheny
case, and the express terms of the statute2 ' could have led the Court to a
determination that the statute was of precisely the same character and effect as
that struck down in Allegheny, except that here the tax was upon personalty,
not realty. Nevertheless, in escaping form and seeking substance, the majority
took a practical approach, pointing out that a mere change in the statutory
16. 78 Sup. Ct. 458 (1958).
17. Id. at 460.
18. The district court's opinion reports that the city adopted the position that: "The
inclusion of the [partial payment] . . . clause would not defeat an ad valorem tax on per-
sonal property in the hands of an independent contractor acquired in the course of carrying
out provisions of a subcontract for defense production." Detroit v. Murray Corp., 132
F. Supp. 899, 903 (E.D. Mich. 1955).
19. The appellant argued that the Government could have made only "advance pay-
ments" towards the purchase of the chattels and therefore were entitled only to a lien
thereon as security. The Court, however, after lengthy consideration of the controlling
regulations, and the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947, found that the "partial pay-
ments" provided for in the contract could validly be made if the contract also provided, as
it in fact did, that upon such "partial payment" title would vest in the Government.
20. 78 Sup. Ct.458,461 (1958).
21. The statite embraces both "... owners or persons in possession of any personal
property [who] shall pay all taxes assessed thereon. . . ." and if such taxes remain unpaid,
" .... the City Treasurer shall . . . levy upon . . . the personal property of any person
refusing or neglecting to pay such tax ... ." Detroit City Charter, Tit. VI, c. IV, §§ 1,
26, 27, cited in Detroit v. Murray Corp., 78 Sup. Ct. 458,469, n. 11 (1958) (dissenting opinion).
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language would clearly make the tax a valid use tax, and therefore held it to be
in practical effect a tax upon use.
That a tax may be levied upon use of property, and that it may be based on
the full value of the property used, have been affirmed too often to be less than
acceptable propositions. The Supreme Court has now clearly indicated that
no immunity from state taxation will be allowed, regardless of the accuracy of
the statutory language used, unless no reasonable basis for justifying the tax
can be found. As a result, the test of constitutionality of such statutes2
would seem no longer to hinge upon whether the tax be in fact one upon use or
property, but rather, whether under any view of the facts a use tax could have
been levied. If one could, then, without concern for legislative intent or form,
the Court will find the tax to be one upon use. It appears that hereafter any
state tax, whether ostensibly one upon use or property, levied against a private
beneficial user of government property, which is neither unreasonable in its
computation nor discriminatory in its application, and which does not purport to
apply to property held by a true government agency, will be found to be a
valid tax upon use.
23
If the federal government should consider the exemption from taxation of
the private use of its property to be desirable, it is not completely without
remedy or solution. Clearly, in the absence of congressional legislation, its
most certain protection is to act wherever possible through its established
agencies. In United States v. Muskegon24 the Court suggested that only when
federal property was in the use of a federal agency, or of a private citizen
whose activities and financial gain were under such strict control and so assimi-
lated by the Government as to have become one of its constituent parts, would
it be exempt from tax upon its use. However, this requirement of a true and
narrow agency relation may be avoided by legislation similar to that which
originally established the Atomic Energy Commission, and which granted
immunity from state tax to both the commission and its "activities." 25 Under that
22. Certainly there remains operative no vestige of what may heretofore have been con-
sidered an "economic burden test." The fact that tax costs are in almost every case absorbed
by the Government through contract, instead of leading the Court to strike down the tax,
was used by it as an argument to demonstrate that the tax is upon the user, and that it
involves the Government only by operation of contract. Concerning the more proper test
of constitutionality, the words of Justice Harlan in his dissenting opinion are worthy of con-
sideration: ". . . [Slince the use of federally owned property as the measure, by value or
amount, of a tax on the privilege of using . . . such property is permissible, the distinction
between 'property' and 'privilege' taxes as a yardstick for judging constitutionality when
both taxes are collectible from a private taxpayer holding the property is certainly left in a
high degree of artificiality." Detroit v. Murray Corp., 78 Sup. Ct. 458, 494 (1958) (dissenting
opinion).
23. The Court feels that to do otherwise is to register a victory for "empty formalism."
Id. at -.
24. Obviously the Court is leaving itself room to preserve, on occasion, the force of the
precedent established in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 159 (1819) where a
state tax upon the Bank of the United States, incorporated by the Congress, was held an
invalid tax upon an agency of the Government.
25. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1809(b) (1953).
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act the Court found state use and sales taxes upon a private contractor with
that commission, and upon his vendor, to be a tax upon one of the commission's
"activities," 26 holding such legislation to be authorized under the necessary and
proper clause of the Constitution. However, care must be had not to infringe
upon the sovereign power of the states to tax all proper objects by granting too
broad an immunity. Vesting title to the Government's property in its established
agencies, and expanding the scope of those agencies' immunity to include their
"activities," might well be the only solution of any practical value.2 7
Contracts - An Advertisement as an Offer.-Defendant store published two
newspaper advertisements in successive weeks. The first read: "Saturday 9 A.M.
Sharp-3 Brand New Fur Coats-Worth to $100.00-First Come First Served-
$1 Each." The second read: "Saturday 9 A.M.- . . . 1 Black Lapin Stole-
Beautiful, Worth $139.50-$1.00--First Come First Served." Plaintiff was the
first to present himself for both offerings and demanded the articles advertised,
indicating his willingness to pay. Defendant refused to sell on each occasion.
Plaintiff brought a suit asserting two causes of action for breach of contract.
The trial court awarded damages only as to the second cause of action. On
appeal to the Supreme Court of Minnesota, held, affirmed. An advertisement
offering for sale a definite article at a quoted price in clear and definite terms,
leaving nothing open for negotiation, constitutes an offer, acceptance of which
will complete a contract. Lefkowitz v. Great Minneapolis Surplus Store Inc.,
- Minn. -, 86 N.W.2d 689 (1957).
Some courts have held a newspaper advertisement to be a valid offer,1 while
others have considered it merely an invitation to make an offer.2 However, the
26. "The constitutional power of Congress to protect any of its agencies from state
taxation ... has long been recognized as applying to those with whom it has made author-
ized contracts .... Certainly the policy behind the power of Congress to create tax
immunities does not turn on the nature of the agency doing the work of the Government.
The power stems from the power to preserve and protect functions validly authorized ...
[and from] the power to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution the
powers vested in the Congress. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, ci. 18. Hence if the present contracts
which the respondent contractors have with the United States, and the performance there-
under, are 'activities' within the meaning of section 9(b) of the Act, the immunity is clear.
Our view is that they are .... " Carson v. Roane-Anderson Co., 342 U.S. 232, 233-34
(1952).
27. Whether or not the Congress would find such exemptions desirable is another ques-
tion. Certainly the current tax provision in the presently effective Atomic Energy Act of
1954, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2015-2208, being designed to "render financial assistance" to the states,
and authorizing the AEC to make payments to the states in lieu of taxes, granting no
immunities, fails to indicate and great concern on the part of Congress for the increasing
financial burden being borne by the Government in its assumed role.
1. R. E. Crummer & Co. v. Nuveen, 147 F.2d 3 (7th Cir. 1945); Johnson v. Capital City
Ford Co., - La. App. -, 85 So. 2d 75 (1956).
2. Georgian Co. v. Bloom, 27 Ga. App. 468, 108 S.E. 813 (1921); Lovett v. Frederick
Loeser & Co., 124 Misc. 81, 207 N.Y. Supp. 753 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1924).
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cases are not necessarily in conflict, for as Professor Williston says, "the con-
struction is rather favored that such an advertisement is a mere invitation to
enter into a bargain rather than an offer . . . [but] there can be no doubt
that a positive offer may be made even by an advertisement or general notice.' 3
Whether an advertisement is an offer is a question of the advertiser's manifest
intention.4 Whether the courts will find that intention manifest in a particular
advertisement depends upon the terms used, and no single criterion can be
isolated.5
An analysis of the cases reveals specific instances where the courts have
refused to find an offer in an advertisement. In Georgian Co. v. Bloom6 an
advertisement which clearly described the goods for sale and expressed a definite
price but failed to indicate the quantity offered was held not to be an offer.7 How-
ever, in R. E. Crummer & Co. v. Nuveen,s where the advertiser offered to redeem
certain bonds without mentioning quantity, the court construed the offer to be
for the purchase of all outstanding bonds. It would appear that in some cases
the requisite of quantity may be implied from custom and usage. While quantity
has been the most common defect, uncertainty as to any essential term will also
prevent an effective offer from arising. In Lovett v. Frederick Loeser & Co.9
an advertisement announced the sale of certain brand name radios but the
court indicated that the subject matter of the sale was not sufficiently identified
since there was a variety of models of that particular make. Where the goods
vary in quality, it would seem that they must be further identified for the
advertisement to constitute an offer.' 0 Essential terms have not usually been
inferred to correct such a defect. The reason would seem to be that in an
advertised offer addressed to the public at large the offeree is not identified,
and therefore, there is no basis for a court to infer terms from past transactions
or reasonable needs, as there might be if the communication were between
individuals.
The instant court impliedly conceded the first advertisement constituted an
offer, but disallowed the cause of action based thereon because the value of the
articles was speculative and uncertain. However, it would seem that there was
no offer at all. The advertisement offered for sale three new fur coats worth
"up to" one hundred dollars. Since there could be a wide range of merchandise
within that category, and since the type of fur was not specified, the goods
offered were not sufficiently identified. The plaintiff's claim relative to the
second advertisement was allowed for there was no uncertainty as to the
identity, quantity, price or any other necessary element.
The court's determination that the offer contained in the second advertisement
3. 1 Wiliston, Contracts § 27 (rev. ed. 1936).
4. J. E. Pinkbam Lumber Co. v. C. W. Griffin & Co., 212 Ala. 341, 102 So. 689 (1925).
5. 1 Corbin, Contracts § 31 (Supp. 1957).
6. 27 Ga. App. 468, 108 S.E. 813 (1921).
7. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Johnson, 209 Mass. 89, 95 N.E. 290 (1911); Lovett v.
Frederick Loeser & Co., 124 Misc. 81, 207 N.Y. Supp. 753 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1924).
8. 147 F.2d 3 (7th Cir. 1945).
9. 124 Misc. 81, 207 N.Y. Supp. 753 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1924).
10. Id. at 85, 207 N.Y. Supp. at 756.
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was accepted presents another question. An offer published in a newspaper is
addressed to the public at large, and may be accepted by anyone fulfilling the
terms of the offer.1" A revocation of an offer to be effective must be communi-
cated to the offeree,' 2 but in the case of a general offer, giving the revocation
publication equivalent to that of the offer has been held a sufficient revocation.' 3
In the instant case, the court disposed of the defendant's contention that the
offer had been modified or revoked simply by stating the general rule that an
offeror may modify his offer any time before acceptance, but not after. The
court failed to explain how that rule applied to the facts of this case. The
plaintiff had done what was requested in the offer when he had been the first
to tender the purchase price in response to the advertisement, but at the time
the plaintiff responded to the first advertisement he was informed of a so-called
"house rule" which provided that the offer was only open to women. Such a
"house rule" could reasonably be inferred to apply to any similar offers made
by the defendant. The plaintiff thus had actual knowledge that the second
advertisement contained that modification, which in effect made the offer
inapplicable to the plaintiff. The absence of any published modification prior
to acceptance would seem immaterial in the presence of plaintiff's actual knowl-
edge of the modification.' 4
Although the determination that there was a valid acceptance does not seem
well founded, this court's decision in refusing to find an offer in the one adver-
tisement and holding that there was an effective offer in the other was sound.
If the terms of an advertisement are uncertain as to identity, quantity, price or
any other necessary element of the subject matter, there can be no doubt that
the advertiser had no intention to contract. On the other hand, where all the
necessary terms have been clearly expressed, the courts should be free to find
an effective offer. The instant case may well represent a more liberal trend on
the part of the courts toward acknowledging that an advertisement can be an
offer. Too often advertising such as this is unscrupulously used to entice
customers, with no intention on the part of the seller to perform. An advertiser
should not be permitted to excite reasonable expectations of performance without
obligation.
Contracts - Reformation of a Written Instrument Because of Mutual
Mistake or Unilateral Mistake Plus Fraud.-An action was brought in equity
by a former insurance agent to reform a written contract and to recover certain
collection fees allegedly due plaintiff after the termination of the agency. There
was no stipulation in the written contract providing for such fees, but plaintiff
alleged that before he consented to sign the contract, defendant orally promised
that he would be entitled to collection fees after termination of the agency,
provided premiums on particular policies continued to be paid, and that the
special agreement would be docketed in the records of the company. The
11. Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., [1893] 1 Q.B. 256 (CA.).
12. Geary v. Atlantic & Pac. Tea Co., 366 Il. 625, 10 N.E.2d 350 (1937).
13. Shuey v. United States, 92 U.S. 73 (1875).
14. 1 Williston, Contracts § 59 (rev. ed. 1936).
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appellate division affirmed special term and dismissed the complaint. The New
York Court of Appeals held, reversed. Where a written instrument does not
completely evidence the oral agreement of the parties by reason of either
mutual mistake or unilateral mistake and fraud, reformation will be given.
Brandwein v. Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co. 3 N.Y.2d 491, 146 N.E.2d 693
(1957).
Long before the enactment of the Statute of Frauds, courts of equity had
assumed the power to reform a written contract if, by reason of either mutual
mistake or unilateral mistake combined with fraud, it did not embody the
intention of the parties.' In seeking such relief, the validity of the agreement
with the defendant is conceded, but the court is requested to correct mistakes
in the written agreement and to enforce it in its corrected form.2
The only grounds for reformation of an instrument are the traditional
ones of mutual mistake of the parties, or unilateral mistake and fraud.3 Under
either theory, the mistake of the plaintiff must be inadvertent and excusable.
4
Where a person knows what is contained in the written agreement, he cannot
later allege that he was induced to sign by a prior or contemporaneous parol
agreement which is not embraced in the writing because there can be no mistake
under such circumstances. 5 Equity will give relief only where a party thinks
the written contract is in accordance with the entire agreement of the parties
and in reality it is not.0
To prevail on the ground of unilateral mistake and fraud, a plaintiff has to
establish all of the elements of an estoppel. 7 It is well established that an oral
promise made with no intention of performing the act promised is a misrepre-
sentation of a material existing fact which will support an action to reform
the contract for fraud, if the other party relies on that promise to his injury.E
It is equally well established that neither the parol evidence rule nor the
Statute of Frauds can preclude proof of fraud or mutual mistake in the incep-
tion of the agreement where the writing does not embody the agreement which
the parties intended.9
In the instant case, the plaintiff, on notice that the oral provisions for added
1. Friedman & Co. v. Newman, 255 N.Y. 340, 345, 174 N.E. 703, 704 (1931).
2. Gillespie v. Moon, 2 Johns. Ch. 585 (N.Y. 1817).
3. 5 Williston, Contracts § 1552 (rev. ed. 1937).
4. Simons v. Crowley, 112 N.Y.S.2d 851 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
5. Wilson v. Deen, 74 N.Y. 531, 535 (1878).
6. Id. at 536.
7. De Baillet-Latour v. De Baillet-Latour, 301 N.Y. 428, 431, 94 N.E.2d 715, 716 (1950).
8. Adams v. Clark, 239 N.Y. 403, 410, 146 N.E. 642, 644 (1925). See also Adams v.
Gillig, 199 N.Y. 314, 92 N.E. 670 (1910) where the court distinguished between a promise
or present intention to do something in the future which constitutes part of the agreement
between the parties, and a mere statement of intention which is not based on any contract
and which may be changed at any time in good faith without changing the obligations of
the parties.
9. Sabo v. Delman, 3 N.Y.2d 155, 143 N.E.2d 906 (1957); Friedman & Co. v. Newman,
255 N.Y. 340, 346, 174 N.E. 703, 705 (1931) ; Spring v. Moncrief, 208 Misc. 671, 144
N.Y.S.2d 664 (Sup. Ct. 1955) ; 5 Williston, Contracts § 1552 (rev. ed. 1937).
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commissions were not included in the written contract, signed the contract in
reliance upon the defendant's representations that such oral provisions would
be recorded in the books of the company. It is well established that a single
contract may be evidenced by a combination of writings intended to constitute
one contract,' 0 and if each separate written instrument is sufficient to satisfy the
Statute of Frauds, the entire contract is enforceable. The key question here
was whether the parties intended that the written agreement alone should
constitute the entire contract, or whether the written agreement plus the entry
on the books of the company were to be considered together.
The majority opinion stressed the fact that it was not dealing with a separate
oral agreement for the collection of extra commissions, and it conceded that
such a collateral oral agreement would have been unenforceable under the
Statute of Frauds'1 and evidence thereof inadmissible under the parol evidence
rule.'2 Rather, the court argued that this oral agreement was part of the entire
oral agreement between the parties, and that, by the weight of authority,' 3
where matter orally agreed upon is not incorporated into the instrument by
reason either of mutual mistake or a unilateral mistake plus fraud on the
defendant's part, neither the parol evidence rule' 4 nor the Statute of Frauds 5
prohibits the reformation of a written contract to include such matter. The
majority apparently assumed that the docketing of the special agreement on
the books of the corporation, if entered as promised, would have been a memo-
randum sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds.
The dissent argued that there was neither a mutual mistake nor a mistake
by the plaintiff accompanied by fraud on the part of the defendant as to the
instrument which was actually executed. It reasoned that the oral provisions in
question were never intended to be incorporated into the written agreement,
10. Marks v. Cowdin, 226 N.Y. 138, 123 N.E. 139 (1919) held that the memorandum
necessary to satisfy the Statute of Frauds need not be one document, but may be pieced
together out of separate writings.
11. Newkirk v. C. C. Bradley & Son, 271 App. Div. 658, 67 N.Y.S.2d 459 (4th Dep't
1947) held that the mere refusal of a defendant to perform his oral promise to give the
plaintiff an agency contract is not enough in the absence of fraud to disregard the Statute
of Frauds.
12. The parol evidence rule is that evidence of a prior or contemporaneous parol agree-
ment is inadmissible where it varies or contradicts the terms of the writing. The general
rule is that where an oral agreement is so closely related to the terms of the written contract
that one would ordinarily be expected to include it in the writing, it is inadmissible. If the
parol agreement would not ordinarily be expected to be included within the written pro-
visions of the contract, it may be proved. Fogeison v. Rackfay Constr. Co., 300 N.Y. 334,
90 N.E.2d 881 (1950) ; Ball v. Grady, 267 N.Y. 470, 196 N.E. 402 (1935) ; Mitchill v. Lath,
247 N.Y. 377, 160 N.E. 646 (1928).
13. See note 9 supra.
14. See note 10 supra.
15. "Every agreement, promise or undertaking is void unless it or some note or memo-
randum thereof be in writing ... if such agreement, promise or undertaking:
1. By its terms is not to be performed within one year from the making thereof or the
performance of which is not to be completed before the end of a lifetime." N.Y.
Pers. Prop. Law § 31(1).
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and there was, therefore, no oral agreement to which the writing could be re-
formed. The dissent appears to assume that only such provisions as are con-
tained in a single written instrument are enforceable under the Statute of Frauds,
and that there can be no enforceable contract arising from those provisions which
both parties agreed upon but which they knew were not to be incorporated
within the four corners of the single written document. This reasoning is
certainly questionable. If what is reduced to a single instrument was never
intended to constitute the entire agreement, one can always introduce evidence
of mutual mistake or fraud to reform the agreement. 16 This is so even if the
agreement contains a merger clause.' 7 A merger clause cannot be used to seal
the lips of the party deceived, and thus become a license to commit fraud.' 8
The dissent also reasoned that the plaintiff could not recover under either
theory of reformation because he was informed by the defendant that the extra
agreement could not be put into the written contract, and that there was, there-
fore, no mistake involved. This again seems to have been based on the invalid
assumption that the particular writing had to contain, or was intended to
contain, the entire agreement between the parties. Under the facts alleged, the
plaintiff was mistakenly led to believe that the agreement for extra commissions
would be noted on the books of the corporation, and that such entry would
comprise part of the over-all contract between the parties.
Since the issue was raised on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the
truth of the plaintiff's allegations should have been conceded. Had they been
so accepted by the court, the case would turn upon whether the memorandum,
if docketed in the corporate records, would have satisfied the Statute of Frauds.
Oddly enough, the answer to that issue was assumed by the majority and omitted
by the dissent. It would appear that mere entry on the corporate books would
not be sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds unless such entry contained
the material elements of the contract and was subscribed by the party to be
charged.' 9 Here, it is not clear just what was meant by "corporate records."
If the parties can be said to have intended an incorporation into the minutes
of a corporate meeting, the record would undoubtedly satisfy the Statute of
Frauds since the minutes are ordinarily signed or attested to by the recording
clerk.20 At any rate, the majority was probably justified in assuming that such
16. Sabo v. Delman, 3 N.Y.2d 155, 143 N.E.2d 906 (1957); DeBaillet-Latour v.
De Baillet-Latour, 301 N.Y. 428, 431, 94 N.E.2d 715, 716 (1950) ; Adams v. Gillig, 199 N.Y.
314, 92 N.E. 670 (1910).
17. A merger clause is one where the parties expressly state that this particular writing
contains the whole of the agreement between the parties, and that no other agreement be-
tween them is of any effect. See Sabo v. Delman, 3 N.Y.2d 155, 143 N.E.2d 906 (1957).
18. Ibid.
19. Lamkin v. Baldwin & Lamkin Mfg. Co., 72 Conn. 57, 43 Atl. 593 (1899); Douchkiss
v. Campbell, 64 N.Y.S.2d 554, aff'd mem., 272 App. Div. 795, 71 N.Y.S.2d 925 (1st Dep't
1947). In 2 Williston, Contracts § 568 (rev. ed. 1937), it is stated that an entry on the
books of a corporation would be sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds, but Professor
Williston apparently is assuming that it contains the material elements of the contract and is
subscribed.
20. Lamkin v. Baldwin & Lamkin Mfg. Co., 72 Conn. 57, 66, 43 Ad. 593, 596 (1899).
[Vol. 27
CASE NOTES
an entry would be subscribed by the recording officer since, under the pleadings,
we must assume that the parties intended to make a binding agreement, and
it is reasonable enough to assume that it would be made in compliance with the
Statute of Frauds.
Grand Jury - Powers of an Extended Grand Jury.-The period of service
of a New York grand jury, impaneled for the June 1955 term of the county
court, wofild have ordinarily terminated at the end of December 1955, but was
extended, as was the term of the court, by the presiding judge under three
successive extension orders to June of 1956. The alleged purpose of the extension
orders was to permit the completion of gambling and waterfront racketeering
investigations pending before the grand jury. The extended grand jury in May
1956 indicted the defendant under a statute prohibiting the sale or distribution
of obscene and pornographic literature. The defendant's motion to dismiss the
indictment upon the grounds that the grand jury did not have jurisdiction to
return such an indictment was sustained by the county court. The appellate
division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals held, two judges dissenting,
reversed. In New York an extended grand jury may return an indictment for
any crime committed within the county for which it was impaneled even though
the extension was merely to permit completion of investigations pending be-
fore the grand jury at the time of the order. People v. Stern, 3 N.Y.2d 658, 148
N.E.2d 400 (1958).
At common law the period of service of a grand jury terminated at the expira-
tion of the term of the court for which it was impaneled.' In some jurisdictions,
however, the length of service of a grand jury is either regulated by statute or
left to the discretion of the court for which it is impaneled. 2 In New York, a
county court judge may extend his own term for as long as he deems necessary,3
and may also extend the period of service of a grand jury, which he is supervising.
Whether an extended grand jury is restricted solely to investigations and
indictments related to the unfinished business then before the grand jury is a
matter which has seldom come before the courts. Here the New York Court
of Appeals rejected the view of the appellate division that the judge's extension
order "to complete investigations pending" could limit the powers of a grand
jury. Although the court conceded that a grand jury is an arm or adjunct of
the county court for purposes of supervision, 4 it nevertheless regarded the
Here, the court held that where a board of directors agreed to a certain resolution, the
recording clerk had the duty to record it and at the proper time verify -the record by his
signature. The court goes on to say that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the law
presumes that such things were done.
1. McDonald v. Colden, 294 N.Y. 172, 61 N.E.2d 432 (1945). See also 38 CJ.S., Grand
Jury § 32 (1943).
2. Shenker v. Harr, 332 Pa. 382, 2 A.2d 298 (1938). See also 38 CJ.S., Grand Jury
§ 32 (1943).
3. N.Y. Judiciary Law § 190(3).
4. Spector v. Allen, 281 N.Y. 251, 22 N.E.2d 360 (1939).
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inquisitorial and indictment powers of a grand jury as independent of the juris-
diction of the court to try such crimes and as applicable to any crime committed
within the county. The majority supported this position by an analysis of
pertinent statutes. While a county court in New York is a court of limited
jurisdiction and may try only certain crimes, 5 this same court may by inter-
vention of a grand jury, subject to the prior jurisdiction of the youth court,
investigate all crimes committed within the county.6 Where, however, the court
lacks jurisdiction over certain crimes, it is required by statute that the county
court send whatever indictments are not triable in that court to the New York
Supreme Court The majority argued that this clearly showed the grand jury's
powers of investigation and indictment to be independent of the jurisdiction of
the court for which it is impaneled, and they are not subject to limitation by an
extension order of the court for which it is impaneled. Section 245 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, providing that a grand jury must inquire into all crimes
committed within the county, was cited as further support of its position. The
view of the lower courts that section 244 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
restricted an extended grand jury solely to a consideration of unfinished business
was rejected as clearly erroneous. The majority pointed out that this statute,
limiting an extended grand jury to incompleted business, applies only when a
grand jury had been recessed upon completion of business and then recalled,
a situation which generally occurs in rural counties.8 Because the grand jury in
the instant case functioned continuously since impaneled, the above statute was
regarded as inapplicable.
In Shenker v. Har9 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held the extension of
a grand jury to be in the discretion of the court, but indicated that such discre-
tion may be abused and should be subject to appellate review. The court ruled
that a grand jury already extended for one year to complete unfinished business
had about reached the extent of its permissible limit,10 and expressed the view
that "a tendency to establish anything approaching permanency in a grand jury
is repugnant to our scheme of government and subversive of individual rights.""n
Commonwealth v. Wilson,12 a lower court case in the same jurisdiction with an
5. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 39.
6. Id. § 39(1).
7. Id. § 40.
8. Prior to the enactment of § 244, the law in New York required a grand jury to be
discharged upon the completion of business before it. In many of the rural counties, only
one or two grand juries were impaneled each year, so that if one was discharged, months
might elapse before a new grand jury would be impaneled. This was particularly harsh on
a defendant, who might be confined for months awaiting the impaneling of a new grand jury
before charges against him might be considered. Section 244 changed the prior law, and
permitted a judge to recess the grand jury on completion of business before it, with a power
to call back the grand jury to consider any new crimes. Once recalled the grand jury is
limited by § 244 solely to a completion of unfinished business. Since the grand jury in the
instant case had functioned continuously § 244 was regarded as inapplicable.
9. 332 Pa. 382, 2 A.2d 298 (1938).
10. Id. at 389, 2 A.2d at 301.
11. Id. at 388-89, 2 A.2d at 301.
12. 134 Pa. Super. 222, 4 A.2d 324 (1939).
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almost identical set of facts as the instant case, held that an extended grand
jury was confined to completion of unfinished business, and could not find an
indictment for any crime not under consideration prior to the extension order,
citing with approval the reasoning of the court in the Skenker case. Under the
present federal rule the period of service of a grand jury may not exceed
eighteen months,' 3 during which time the grand jury may investigate and
indict for any crime.' 4
In the present case the dissenting opinion condemned the practice of allowing
an extended grand jury to consider new matter as unnecessary and latently
abusive. Under the rules of the county court a new grand jury is drawn each
month with the judges rotating each month as supervisor thereof, in addition
to serving as presiding judge over one of the trial terms.' 5 The rules also provide
that an extended grand jury must continue to be supervised by the judge that
extended it.16 Judge Fuld, writing the dissenting opinion, considered the majority
decision as giving a single judge the power to nullify the above rules which were
created by all of the judges of the county court. Since a new grand jury was
impaneled each month, and there was a current grand jury impaneled and
available to investigate the alleged crime in the instant case, the dissent con-
sidered the majority decision as giving the extended grand jury unnecessary
power in allowing it to consider new business. The majority considered this
argument insufficient reason to curtail the powers of the grand jury in that the
above rules were designed by judges for their own convenience, while a grand
jury derives its power to exist from the state constitution.' 7 This argument
would seem to lack merit since a currently impaneled grand jury could have
handled the investigation and indictment in the instant case in complete con-
formity with the constitution.'3
The majority opinion is correct in concluding that there is no New York
statute expressly limiting an extended grand jury to a completion of unfinished
business, but the decision brings about an unnecessary and harmful result. It
places an individual judge and district attorney in a position to exercise a
strong personal influence over a grand jury by functioning with it for a great
length of time. Furthermore, a grand jury which has served for an extensive
period might by virtue of its continuous investigation into crime become prosecu-
tion-minded and hardened to the pleas of persons accused of having committed
a crime.
The powers of an extended grand jury and particularly the power to investi-
gate matters not under investigation at the time of the extension, should be
limited expressly by the legislature in order to avoid abuses which could result
13. Fed. R. Crim. P.6(g).
14. Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273 (1919).
15. People v. Stern, 3 A.D.2d 443, 448, 162 N.Y.S.2d 180, 184 (2d Dep't 1957).
16. Ibid.
17. N.Y. Const. art. I, § 6. The pertinent portion of this subdivision essentially provides





from the instant decision. The limitations of the Pennsylvania rule or the
federal rule would more practically serve the ends of justice.19
International Law - Effect of a Senate Reservation Upon a Treaty.
-The New York State Power Authority applied to the Federal Power Com-
mission for a license to construct a hydroelectric project to utilize Niagara River
water made available to the United States under a 1950 treaty with Canada.
The Senate, in consenting to ratification of that treaty, had imposed a reserva-
tion that no project for the redevelopment of the United States' share of the
water would be undertaken until specifically authorized by act of congress. The
FPC therefore denied the application on the ground that the reservation pre-
vented its jurisdiction from attaching. On petition to the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, held, one judge dissenting, reversed.
A treaty reservation which is merely a senatorial expression of domestic policy
is not part of a treaty, and senate ratification makes such treaty valid and opera-
tive without the reservation. Power Authority v. Federal Power Comm'n, 247
F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir.), vacated as moot sub nom. American Pub. Power Ass'n v.
Power Authority, 355 U.S. 64 (1957).
A treaty is "... . primarily a compact between independent nations." I While
no treaty has ever been held unconstitutional, the Supreme Court early indi-
cated that the treaty power is subject to judicial review.2 In Geofroy v. Riggs,
the Court stated that the treaty power extended to ". . . any matter which is
properly the subject of negotiation with a foreign country," subject only to
constitutional restraints and those ". . . arising from the nature of the govern-
ment itself and of that of the States." 3 The Court also stated that a treaty is
"... placed on the same footing . . . with an act of legislation. . . . [I]f the
two are inconsistent, the one last in date will control the other, provided always
the stipulation of the treaty on the subject is self-executing." 4 However, a
subsequent act of Congress will be construed as not to conflict with a prior
treaty, if such construction can be reasonably made.5
A treaty reservation has been defined as a formal declaration relating to the
terms of a proposed treaty made by one of the governments to the other.6 By
analogy to contract law, it is the refusal of an offer and the making of a counter-
19. See pp. 130-31 supra.
1. Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884).
2. United States v. Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181, 207-208 (1926) ; Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S.
258 (1890) (dictum); The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616 (1870) (dictum);
Clark v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 674, 697 (1853).
3. 133 U.S. at 267 (dictum). A similar dictum appears in Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S.
(14 Pet.) 470, 496 (1840), where the Court said the treaty power must be exercised in a
manner ". . . consistent with the nature of our institutions, and the distribution of powers
between the general and state governments."
4. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
5. Ibid.
6. Miller, Reservations to Treaties 75 (1919).
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offer.7 The proposed treaty with the reservation must therefore be accepted by
the other government in order to become law. While the Constitution, in requir-
ing senate ratification of a treaty," does not expressly recognize the right of the
Senate to make reservations or amendments of any kind,9 it was early recognized
that the necessary senatorial consent may be conditional.10 If the President is
in accord, he may transmit the proposed treaty together with the reservation to
the other nation as a counteroffer. If the other nation accepts, a valid treaty
arises."z
In the instant case the majority considered the reservation to be related to a
matter of purely domestic concern, having nothing whatever to do with the
rights of either party under the treaty. The so-called Canadian "acceptance"
was considered merely a disclaimer of interest, since Canada had expressly
stated that the reservation did not affect her rights or duties under the treaty,
and the Court concluded that the reservation was not the law of the land as
legislation 12 or treaty.
The majority nevertheless decided that the Senate's ratification was effective
to validate the treaty itself. The sole authority relied on was New York Indians
v. United States, 3 involving a proviso which the Senate had attached to a treaty
with certain Indian tribes, providing that the treaty would be of no effect until
fully explained to and accepted by each of the tribes. The United States there-
after sought to avoid the treaty by enforcing the proviso to the detriment of
the Indian tribes who had acted upon the treaty, and to whom the proviso had
never been communicated. The Court refused to allow this, and disregarded the
proviso but not the treaty. The dissent here distinguished that case on the
ground that equitable considerations gave rise to an estoppel in favor of the
Indian tribes.
The minority reasoned that the reservation, from its language and legislative
history, was intended to be a sine qua non to the Senate's consent, and that
since ratification of the treaty was conditioned upon the validity of the reserva-
tion, they must stand or fall together. The dissent also contended that the Sen-
ate's reservation was not merely an expression of policy or of purely domestic
concern, since both nations had an interest in the manner of harnessing the avail-
able water power in a fashion that would preserve the scenic beauty of Niagara
Falls. Further, the dissent argued that the reservation should still be valid even
if Canada had no interest in its subject matter, since it was at least pertinent to
the international negotiation. The test suggested by the dissent was that a treaty
reservation is valid if " . . . inspired by, an outgrowth of, and inextricably con-
nected with, an admittedly valid subject matter of a treaty. . ."4 In support
7. 1 Oppenheim, International Law 914 (8th ed., Lauterpacht, 1955).
8. U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, c. 2.
9. The difference between an amendment and a reservation is purely one of form. Miller,
Reservations to Treaties 76-77 (1919).
10. Haver v. Yaker, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 32, 35 (1869). The President cannot be compelled
to accept Senate conditions. Rottshaefer, Constitutional Law 383 (1939).
11. Miller, op. cit. supra note 7 at 4-5.
12. Concurrence of the House of Representatives was lacking.
13. 170 US. 1 (1898).
14. Power Authority v. FPC, 247 F.2d 538, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (dissenting opinion).
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of this test the dissent cited Downes v. Bidwe115 as an instance where a pro-
vision of purely domestic application was upheld as part of a treaty. That case
involved a treaty with Spain, by which Puerto Rico was ceded to the United
States. Article 9, which declared that the civil rights and political status of the
inhabitants therein should be determined by act of Congress, was held by the
Supreme Court to be valid.16 It would seem, however, that the political status
of inhabitants of this newly acquired territory was not of purely domestic con-
cern to the United States but was of mutual concern to both nations since the
inhabitants were formerly Spanish subjects. The United States may have had
the prime interest but it did not have the sole interest.
The minority argument that the reservation related to matters not of purely
domestic concern, and hence of interest to Canada, conflicted with the majority
merely in the interpretation of the facts. The dissent's view that Canada had an
interest in the reservation because of its concern with the scenic beauty of
Niagara Falls, is the more persuasive one. The majority, however, relied strongly
on Canada's express statement denying any interest in the subject matter of the
reservation, and chose rather to interpret the reservation as merely a senatorial
"expression of domestic policy" which was never intended to be part of the treaty.
The instant case is more interesting for the problems it skirted than those it
decided. By holding that the reservation was not part of the treaty, the Court
avoided the need of determining any constitutional issues. As to the validity of
a part of a treaty dealing with domestic matters, there can be no doubt that
matters of purely domestic concern cannot be validly incorporated into a treaty.
As to what is "purely domestic," the majority and dissent presented conflicting
tests. The majority contended that the reservation must embrace matters which
require the consent of the other party to the treaty, while the dissent's more
liberal test would include matters not requiring foreign consent, if pertinent to
the treaty. There is some virtue in both views. The majority test is more definite
and hence easier to apply. The principal virtue of the minority test is that it
eliminates the necessity for congressional legislation in matters pertinent to the
treaty, and not requiring foreign consent, it thus expedites matters. However,
the senatorial power to condition its consent was not intended to be so broad as
to eliminate the House of Representatives from considerations which are basi-
cally domestic. The dissent's test is valid only if applied within these bounds.
Whether a treaty can survive where part of it has been declared invalid was
another problem which the Court avoided by holding that the reservation was
not intended to be part of the treaty. Although no case has held that treaties
are subject to constitutional limitations, there can be no doubt that the treaty
power is thus limited, for the Supreme Court has taken this position in dicta
for more than a century.17 In the recent case of Reid v. Covert Justice Black
stated, "it would be manifestly contrary to the objectives of those who created
the Constitution, .. . let alone alien to our entire constitutional history and
tradition ... to construe Article VI as permitting the United States to exercise
15. 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
16. Id. at 311.
17. See notes 2, 3 supra.
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power under an international agreement without observing constitutional pro-
hibitions." Is
It would seem clear that, contrary to the position of the dissent, an invalid
clause in a treaty need not cause the entire treaty to fall. The court should
strike down the invalid portion alone, unless it is an inseparable and material
part of the treaty without which its very purpose is defeated. In the instant
case, where the reservation concerned matters purely domestic, the argument
for upholding the remainder of the treaty is even stronger. To expect a nation
to accept a treaty which may subsequently fail, solely by reason of an invalid
exercise of internal power by the United States Senate concerning purely do-
mestic matters, is inconsistent with the contract concept of a treaty, as well as
with the efficient management of foreign affairs. The minority argument that
the Senate would not have consented but for the reservation is not compelling.
It is not unreasonable to put the burden of the error on the body which made the
error. This is especially true since the Senate has available the means of pro-
tecting itself. As the majority suggested, the Senate in giving its consent may
provide that the rights of both signatories shall not vest until the enactment of
appropriate congressional legislation. Rather than require foreign nations to
deal with the United States at their peril, it is preferable to treat an invalid
senate reservation as outside the treaty and of no effect on consent thereto.
Negotiable Instruments - Validity of Endorsements on Checks Obtained
by Use of Fictitious Name.--Over a two year period a deputy tax collector
filed "W-2" forms and income tax returns showing overpayments and requesting
refunds. The collector used fictitious names for nonexistent taxpayers and
nonexistent employers. Refund checks were issued in the name of the fictitious
taxpayers. The collector endorsed the names of the nonexistent payees and
deposited the checks in accounts which he had opened in various banks. The
checks were forwarded to the appellant banks, who after affixing an obligatory
guaranty of prior endorsements, presented the checks to a federal reserve bank
for payment. After discovering the fraud, the Government brought an action
against the banks on their guaranty of prior endorsements. On appeal from
a judgment in favor of the Government, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit, held, one judge dissenting, reversed. Where a person, through
the use of the mails, assumes a fic titious identity and has a check issued to
him in the fictitious name, his endorsement of the fictitious name is not a
forgery. Atlantic Nat'l Bank v. United States, 250 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1957).
Whether the endorsement by an impostor of a fictitious payee's name consti-
tutes a forgery or a genuine endorsement by the impostor in his assumed
identity of payee depends upon whether title to the instrument remains in the
drawer.' If the drawer intended to make the instrument payable to the actual
person pretending to be another who does not exist, and not to the fictitious
18. 354 U.S. 1, 17 (1957).
1. Negotiable Instruments Law § 23.
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person named in the instrument, title passes to the impostor.2 If the impostor
obtains title, even though voidable, his endorsement is genuine and negotiation
to a holder in due course transfers valid title to such holder.3
Where the impostor deals with the drawer in person, it is almost universally
held that the impostor acquires a voidable title to the instrument.4 In United
States v. First Nat'l Bank,5 A obtained possession of B's adjusted service certifi-
cate and, assuming the identity of B, applied in person to the Veterans' Admin-
istration for benefits on the basis of the certificate. The Government mailed A
a check naming B as payee, which A endorsed by signing B's name. The court,
applying the "impostor rule," held that A's endorsement of B's name passed
valid title, and quoted from United States v. First Nat'l Bank6 to the effect
that ". . . while the drawer acts in the mistaken belief that the person with
whom he deals either in person or by correspondence is the person whose name
he has assumed and pretends to be, still it is the intent of the drawer to make
the check . . . payable to the identical person with whom he deals. .... -.
Where the dealings between the impostor and the drawer are by means of the
mail or telegraph, the majority of jurisdictions hold the situation not essentially
different from that where the impostor deals in person with the drawer.8 In
United States v. Continental-American Bank & Trust Co.,9 A represented her-
self to be B, a widow of a war veteran, and applied for and received, through
correspondence with the Veterans' Administration, widows' allowances in the
form of a check. The bank was held to have acquired valid title to the check
endorsed by A with B's name. The court reasoned that if the checks were applied
for and issued by the drawer to the real person named as payee but had then
come into the hands of a person not intended to be the payee, the endorsements
would be forgeries. On the other hand where the checks were intended to go
and did go to a particular flesh and blood person as payee, though that intention
was procured by fraudulent misrepresentation as to the person's name and
status, title, though voidable, is acquired as payee.10
In the present case, due to the misrepresentation by the collector, the Gov-
2. Britton, Bills and Notes § 151 (1943).
3. Negotiable Instruments Law §§ 52, 57. But see United States v. Union Trust Co.,
139 F. Supp. 819 (D. Md. 1956), which holds that where a check is delivered to and
endorsed by a person having the same or a similar name as that of the intended payee, the
erroneous delivery does not pass title, for it was not the drawer's intent to make the check
payable to the person who received the check.
4. Uriola v. Twin Falls Bank & Trust Co., 37 Idaho 332, 215 Pac. 1080 (1923); Mont-
gomery Garage Co. v. Manufacturers' Liab. Ins. Co., 94 N.J.L. 152, 109 AtI. 296 (1920);
Halsey v. Bank & Trust Co., 270 N.Y. 134, 200 N.E. 671 (1936); North Philadelphia Trust
Co. v. Kensington Nat'l Bank, 328 Pa. 298, 196 At. 14 (1938).
5. 131 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 774 (1943).
6. 124 F.2d 484, (10th Cir. 1941).
7. Id. at 486.
8. United States v. Union Trust Co., 139 F. Supp. 819 (D. Md. 1956); Boatsman v.
Stockmen's Nat'l Bank, 56 Colo. 495, 138 Pac. 764 (1914) ; 5 Williston, Contracts § 1517(B)
(rev. ed. 1937).
9. 175 F.2d 271 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 870 (1949).
10. Id. at 272.
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eminent issued checks to nonexistent taxpayers. The Government did not intend
to issue these checks to fictitious beings but, in reliance on the income tax
return, intended to pay the person who prepared and filed the return, namely
the collector, in his role as the nonexistent taxpayer. Since the drawer of a
negotiable instrument warrants the existence of the payee," and since here the
collector was in existence and the named payee was not, there appears a clear
intent on the part of the drawer to deal with the existing person, the collector,
and the "impostor rule" was properly applied.
The dissent maintained that the collector did not pretend that he was any one
of the fictitious payees, but rather pretended that these taxpayers existed and
were entitled to refunds.' 2 However, it would seem that the very nature of the
plot dictated that the collector assume the identity of each payee. The fact that
the collector opened various bank accounts in fictitious names strengthens such
an interpretation of his misrepresentations.
Although the majority has correctly applied the "impostor rule," any
rule of law which depends on a determination of a party's subjective intent
necessarily leads to conflicting decisions. The need for certainty and definiteness
in the negotiable instruments field could be fulfilled in the instant situation by
the adoption of the solution proposed by the Uniform Commercial Code, which
provides: "An endorsement by any person in the name of a named payee is
effective if . .. an impostor by use of the mails or otherwise has induced the
maker or drawer to issue the instrument to him .. . in the name of the payee.
)., Under this provision, no distinction between transactions in person
and through the mails would be made, and the need for determining the drawer's
intent would be eliminated. Such a provision places the burden of loss upon the
maker or drawer in all such situations, so long as the instrument is endorsed to
an innocent party, and enhances the fluid circulation of negotiable instruments.
Taxation - Refund of Taxes Paid Under M/istake of Law.-Plaintiff
brought an action to recover taxes paid without protest to New York City under
a tax statute which was later declared unconstitutional. On appeal to the New
York Court of Appeals, held, two judges dissenting, relief denied. Where a tax
is paid without protest and not under duress, a refund may not be recovered
after such tax is declared unconstitutional, notwithstanding a statute permitting
relief for mistake of law. Mercury Mack. Importing Corp. v. City of New
York, 3 N.Y.2d 418, 144 N.E.2d 400 (1957).
In the absence of statutory provision to the contrary, it is the general rule that
taxes voluntarily paid may not be recovered.' Payments are involuntary when
11. Negotiable Instruments Law § 61; Callaway v. Hamilton Nat'l Bank, 195 F.2d 556,
562 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
12. 250 F.2d at 119.
13. Uniform Commercial Code § 3-405(1)(a).
1. Pettibone v. Cook County, 31 F. Supp. 881 (D. Minn. 1940); Matter of Village of
Delhi, 201 N.Y. 408, 94 N.E. 874 (1911).
1958) CASE NOTES
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
made under duress- or under material mistake of fact,3 and in those instances
protest is not required. Tax payments made without protest under mistake
of law are generally held to be voluntary and therefore not recoverable.' There
is doubt as to the effect of protest; some jurisdictions hold that protest of
itself renders payment involuntary,- while others hold that protest has little or
no effect.6 The New York view has been that protest alone does not establish
the involuntary character of the payment of taxes made under mistake of law.T
Section 112-f of the New York Civil Practice Act provides: "When relief
against mistake is sought . . . relief shall not be denied merely because the
mistake is one of law rather than one of fact."8 If taxes paid without protest or
duress under mistake of fact may be recovered, may not taxes similarly paid
under mistake of law? In the present case, the New York Court of Appeals
held that they may not.
The majority's first reason for denying recovery of taxes voluntarily paid
under mistake of law was one of practicality. The court argued that if illegal
taxes are voluntarily paid, it is assumed that they can be expended without
making financial provision for contingent refunds, and that to permit recovery
would be to disrupt the government's financial planning.
In support of this argument the court cited decisions of Kentucky and
Connecticut which have excepted cases involving taxes from their common-law
rule permitting relief under mistakes of law,9 and California decisions making
the same exception to the California statutory rule.' 0 However, as Judge Fuld
noted in his dissent," none of these states had a statute similar to the New
York statute involved here.'2 Furthermore, the Connecticut decisions cited do
not support the exceptions the present court has made. The Connecticut cases
did not involve mistakes of law."3 Indeed, another Connecticut case, which
went unmentioned, allowed recovery of taxes paid under mistake of law.' 4 The
2. Peyser v. City of New York, 70 N.Y. 497 (1877).
3. Adrico Realty Corp. v. City of New York, 250 N.Y. 29, 164 N.E. 732 (1928).
4. 3 Cooley, Taxation § 1294 (4th ed. 1924).
5. Albro v. Kettelle, 42 R.I. 270, 107 Atl. 198 (1919).
6. Missouri ex rel. S. S. Kresge Co. v. Howard, 357 Mo. 302, 208 S.W.2d 247 (1947).
7. Peyser v. City of New York, 70 N.Y. 497 (1877).
8. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 112-f.
9. Pitt v. City of Stamford, 117 Conn. 388, 167 At. 919 (1933) ; H. E. Verran Co. v.
Town of Stamford, 108 Conn. 47, 142 At]. 578 (1928); Morris v. New Haven, 78 Conn. 673,
63 Ati. 123 (1906); Coleman v. Inland Gas Corp., 231 Ky. 637, 21 S.W.2d 1030 (1929);
Louisville & N.R.R. v. Hopkins County, 87 Ky. 605, 9 S.W. 497 (1888).
10. Southern Serv. Co. v. Los Angeles County, 15 Cal. 2d 1, 97 P.2d 963 (1940);
Wingerter v. San Francisco, 134 Cal. 547, 66 Pac. 730 (1901).
11. 3 N.Y.2d at 430, 144 N.E.2d at 406 (dissenting opinion).
12. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 112-f.
13. Pitt v. City of Stamford, 117 Conn. 388, 167 Ati. 919 (1933), which involved a
mistake of fact materially contributed to by taxpayer; H. E. Verran Co. v. Town of Stam-
ford, 108 Conn. 47, 142 Atl. 578 (1928), where the taxpayer was denied recovery because
there was no mistake of law but rather a voluntary "guess" as to what amount would be
due in law.
14. Bridgeport Hydraulic Co. v. Bridgeport, 103 Conn. 249, 130 AtI. 164 (1925).
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California decisions are also of little authority, since that state does not permit
recovery of taxes paid without protest under mistake of fact,15 a point of law
which is an essential premise to the controversy in this case.
The majority also argued that recovery of taxes paid without protest under
mistake of law was not within the intent of the Legislature since section 112-f
of the Civil Practice Act did not "... place mistakes of law in all respects
upon a parity with mistakes of fact"' 6 and that the exception here made was
valid since section 112-f contains no reference to tax law.'7 But the statute
neither includes nor excludes tax law or any other specific subject. Is recovery
to be denied in a contract action because the statute does not mention contract
law?
The majority considered it significant that the Law Revision Commission,' 8
in proposing section 112-f, discussed the Connecticut and Kentucky rule permit-
ting recovery for mistakes of law, and concluded that the Commission impliedly
adopted the exception those states made in tax cases. However, as the dissent
pointed out, the court failed to note the discussion of the rule in New York,
where the Commission stated: "Cases in New York where the recovery would
be proper, except for the doctrine distinguishing mistakes of law and mistakes
of fact, [are] . . . cases where the action is between an individual and a gov-
ernmental body . . . .,19 More significantly, the cases then cited by the Com-
mission all involved recovery of taxes illegally levied,20 strong evidence that the
Law Revision Commission did not consider that an exception should be made in
tax cases.
The instant case makes the effect of protest upon the payment of taxes
uncertain. The court itself reiterated 2' the earlier New York view22 that protest
is merely an indication that a tax is not paid voluntarily, yet seemed to imply
that protest alone would have been sufficient to justify a recovery here. To
regard protest with such significance would encourage the filing of protest with
every payment of tax as a matter of self-protection and as a result protest would
become an empty form.
The determination of the majority does not stand analysis either from the point
of view of practicality or of legislative intent. The practical argument fails to
consider the disruption to the taxpayer's financial security, which may be con-
siderable, and permits the municipality to benefit from levying an unconstitu-
tional tax. Moreover, the "evil" attendant upon permitting recovery, namely, the
disruption of the government's financial planning, might be avoided or, at least,
curtailed by a reasonable but relatively short statute of limitations upon suits
for recovery of taxes paid.
The real issue in the present case was whether a payment under mistake of
15. Southern Serv. Co. v. Los Angeles County, 15 Cal 2d 1, 97 P.2d 963 (1940).
16. 3 N.Y.2d at 427, 144 N.E.2d at 404.
17. Tid.
18. N.Y. Legis. Doc. (1942) No. 65(B).
19. Id. at p. 11 (Emphasis added).
20. Id. at pp. 23-24.
21. 3 N.Y.2d at 425, 144 N.E.2d at 402-03.
22. Peyser v. City of New York, 70 N.Y. 497 (1877).
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law is voluntary. Adrico Realty Corp. v. City of New York, 23 where it was
stated that ". . . a voluntary payment of a tax made under a mistake of law
. ..cannot be recovered, ' 24 and on which the majority relied, was decided
prior to the enactment of section 112-f, and is no authority on that issue. The
majority thus treated as decided that which was to be decided in this case and
failed to consider the effect of the mistake of law itself upon the character of
the payment. It is submitted that a payment under mistake of law is as
involuntary as a payment under mistake of fact.
23. 250 N.Y. 29, 164 N.E. 732 (1928).
24. Id. at 32, 164 N.E. at 732. Accord, Matter of Village of Delhi, 201 N.Y. 408, 94 N.E.
874 (1911). These cases were decided prior to § 112-f when mistake of law was no ground
for relief in any action and in such cases there could be no recovery in the absence of other
circumstances. It is fallacious to argue that, because there was no recovery, those cases are
authority that a payment under mistake of law is voluntary.
